This article draws on sociological studies of corporate social responsibility, new governance and legal transplant theories to reconsider the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) as regulators and agents of change in the field of human rights. The article demonstrates the potentials of transnational corporations as vehicles for the transplanting of human rights sensibilities in post-colonial settings through the use of corporate social responsibility practices. It does so by reconsidering the institutional role of transnational corporations, not as objects of international human rights regulation, but as actual regulators in this field.
Introduction
Most international human rights law textbooks focus on the state as the primary regulator of human rights and the individual as the subject of those rights. 1 This statist paradigm which stands at the centre of human rights law is linked to a command-and-control type governance that considers the state as the sole dutybearer and authority with regard to regulation of human rights within its sovereign territory. 2 Due to this structure, the role of international law in relation to corporate actors has primarily been to define the rights and obligations of states in the context of investment issues, 3 while failing to impose any respective direct international obligations on corporations regarding their involvement in human rights abuses. This statist paradigm is similarly prevalent in the sociology of human rights and legal transplants and diffusion theories. These theories typically examine the appearance, development and institutionalisation of legal regimes and centre on the social, political and cultural conditions in which legal norms are consolidated and violated. 4 Sociologists of human rights who explore the multiple ways in which international human rights regimes may influence the design and structuring of domestic regimes primarily centre on legal instruments such as inter-state treaties and on governmental and civil society agents in their assessment and analysis of the various ways in which human rights are mobilised and institutionalised. Their inquiries focus on the ways in which international law shapes state behaviour, the effectiveness of treaty regimes in changing such behaviour, the relationship between ratification of treaties and domestic human rights practices, and the mechanisms of social influence through which states and institutions affect the behaviour of other states.
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These studies posed a ground-breaking challenge to the assumption that international human rights law does not make a difference and lacks any real influence in the world. They exposed the importance of international human rights law through their concentration on its influence on mobilisation processes within states: how agents of change and transnational networks used international human rights law to penetrate the sovereign veil and instigate domestic processes of change through social processes other than traditional compliance, such as the changing of political agendas, creating collective action problems and influencing legal decisions. 6 However, the focus of these human rights scholarships has thus far been mostly on state-driven, public human rights processes as the main source for social change, while often marginalising the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) as agents of change in processes relating to human rights diffusion and institutionalisation. The present article challenges the prevalent perspectives regarding TNCs' role in international human rights law. Through the analysis of corporate social responsibility practices implemented in Bangladesh following the Rana Plaza disaster, it explores whether TNCs could be considered important players in the acts of ordering the field of human rights. Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of legal transplants, sociological studies of corporate social responsibility, and novel regulatory models, 7 the article suggests conceptualising TNCs as potential carriers of human rights norms to post-colonial settings, potentially initiating bottom-up changes in human rights standards. This article explores the way in which TNCs may act as agents of legal change in the transnational arena although not formally possessing public power, and how they may contribute-alongside and in collaboration with states-to the design and enforcement of human rights regimes rather than simply posing a threat to them. This perspective undermines the archetypical dichotomy between publicstatist regulation and market self-regulation in the form of soft law, and offers a collaborative public-private approach to global regulation of human rights. Conceptualising transnational corporations as important regulatory actors in the field of human rights could also serve as a platform to rethink some of the prevailing normative assumptions of the relationship between TNCs and human rights, and raise significant questions regarding our understanding of human rights theories and doctrines in an era of dominant private transnational corporate power.
The article proceeds as follows. Part 2 reviews discussions regarding the primary regulatory actors involved in the designing and structuring of human rights regimes, first from the perspective of classical international human rights law and sociology of human rights, then from the perspective of new governance theories. Drawing on the new governance models, this part will examine TNCs' role as regulatory actors in the field of human rights through means of corporate social responsibility practices. Part 3 characterises this role through the theoretical 2 The public/private divide in international human rights discourse and its challenges
The centrality of the state is one of the most significant characteristics of classic international law. 8 According to this traditional view, given that states are the primary subjects of international law and its authority is derived from their consent, they retain complete discretion with regard to their sovereign jurisdiction, and have a claim on the monopolistic use of force within their boundaries. 9 Consequently, human rights were originally perceived as a matter belonging to the domestic sphere, 10 often in the context of protecting individuals from the potentially harmful and abusive power of the state, 11 thereby limiting states' power. 12 As one international scholar put it:
Human rights are ultimately a profoundly national-not international-issue. States are the principal violators of human rights and the principal actors governed by the regime's norms; international human rights are concerned primarily with how a government treats inhabitants of its own country. 13 In congruence with this view, the traditional instruments used to set human rights standards and protections are international covenants that oblige states, and states only, as the contracting parties. 14 Accordingly, the emphasis in this type of treaty-regime is the sovereign's limited renunciation of national authority and the retention of discretion with regard to the implementation of these internationally agreed upon norms.
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Nonetheless, in the face of globalisation processes, privatisation of governmental functions, global mobility of capital and trade liberalisation, as well as the growth of transnational civil society and fragmented centres of power, nonstate actors began to pose new challenges to the traditional state-oriented nature of international human rights law and to the state-individual relationship's centrality in this regime. 16 TNCs with immense economic powers moved their production sites to places in which local laws were most favourable for them, hence enabling them maximum profit with minimum legal liabilities. These scholarships are not constrained by conceiving states as the sole duty bearers with regard to human rights and rigorously address the obligations of private corporate actors. However, the main puzzle that motivates most studies in such fields focuses as well on the soft law/hard law distinction and its implications for effectively regulating and taming corporate complicity in violation of human rights. This focus on the hard law/soft law puzzle implicitly assumes the corporate actor as an object of international regulation in contrast to the state's classic public regulatory role.
New Governance Theories: Private entities as 'law-makers'
In recent years, a new theoretical framework has emerged that suggests a further paradigm shift with respect to the command-and-control versus market regulation dichotomy in the field of global governance. Governance, as defined by John Ruggie, 'refers to the systems of authoritative norms, rules, institutions and practices by means of which any collectivity, from the local to the global, manages its common affairs' . 27 The new governance model challenges the classical view that the regulatory power of administrative agencies is based on their superior knowledge, and focuses on the increased participation of non-state actors in the process of regulation by promoting collaborative public-private standard-setting.
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Within this paradigm, private entities and institutions are regarded as normgenerating subjects, 29 in contrast to merely the objects of regulation, 30 thus creating a new division of labour between the state and other social actors. 31 In other words, rather than conceptualising non-state actors as passive objects of regulation, whose 'agency is limited to choosing whether to comply with the regulations to which they are subjected' , 32 this model endeavours to harness private entities' practices, standard-making, and resources, to ameliorate the effectiveness of regulation. The new governance model is often taken to be a response to the process of globalisation, and more specifically, to the failure of international 'old governance' 34 to effectively regulate businesses in the transnational arena. This empirical claim emphasises the way in which the prior, state-centric hierarchical governance model, consisting of treaty-based mandatory regimes had limited capacity in dealing with the challenges of strong economic actors, globalisation, and the attendant societal challenges. 35 Abbott and Snidal characterised these new regulatory initiatives as having two main characteristics. The first is a central role that private actorsnamely NGOs and private firms-play in forming and designing these regulatory norms (as opposed to that of the state). The second is the voluntary nature of these norms, although they involve the typical functions of administrative statist regulation, such as rule-making, and implementation and imposition of sanctions.
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The state, in this new regulatory model, remains a significant actor, albeit not in its role as a top-down commander, but rather as an orchestrator operating through the promotion of networks of different actors and institutions engaging in regulatory activities. 37 Under the new governance model, the state encourages private actors to draw on their great resources and capacities in order to self-regulate and participate in regulating others through varied forms of private ordering. This decentralisation mechanism works through various networks in which non-state actors are partners in governance and not mere objects of regulation, which, in turn, alleviates the adversarial nature of old governance regulation.
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In addition, through the active participation of multiple actors in governance processes, different societal actors become engaged in dialogue and deliberation regarding both the normative and practical aspects of standards-setting. This type of discourse encourages different societal actors to take mutual responsibility for human rights violations. 39 Amongst these diverse types of regulatory initiatives, the present article will focus on voluntary practices of corporate social responsibility. 
Corporate Social Responsibility as a form of New Governance
One of the major focuses of corporate social responsibility practices in the last two decades has been the improvement of labour conditions in developing countries characterised by weak institutions of domestic labour governance. After the exposure of the precarious working conditions in factories manufacturing for corporations such as Nike, Gap and Walmart in the 1990s, a large number of retailers and brands in the apparel, electronics and food industries have adopted codes of conduct establishing standards for working conditions in their supply chain, along with enforcement mechanisms. 40 These different initiatives offered a way to advance workers' rights on the ground, independently of the legal regime regulating labour conditions in a particular state, and contributed to the local human rights discourse amongst workers, factory managers, trade unions and governmental agents. The ability of private entities to take part in global regulation of social fields has been recognised by sociologists, 41 but has not been the focus of the sociology of human rights. The following section offers the conceptual lens of legal transplants to critically explore the regulatory role of corporations and elucidate the ways in which TNCs serve as carriers of human rights norms into post-colonial settings through corporate social responsibility practices and policies.
Legal transplants and corporate social responsibility: Conceptualising corporations' role as agents of legal change
Although a vast amount of literature has been written both on theories of legal transplants and on the subject of corporate social responsibility, these two frameworks have yet to be discussed in relation to one another. Following the propositions of new governance theories and their perception of private entities' potential role in formulating and designing legal regimes, the following section will offer an explanatory framework for this role and for TNCs' influence on shaping human rights norms. It will do so by considering TNCs as agents of legal change, and corporate social responsibility practices as the means to implement such change.
What are legal transplants?
The legal transplant framework typically deals with the movement of law from one jurisdiction to another and the relevant actors in this process of mobilisation of the law. Although originating in Alan Watson's positivist-formalist approach which regards law as mobile and autonomous, bearing no connection to the social circumstances surrounding it, 42 this legal scholarship has since then evolved to socio-legal approaches assuming legal pluralism, 43 and challenging the underlying assumptions of Watson's positivist paradigm.
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The law, under the socio-legal paradigm, is understood in broader terms to include within its definition forms other than the positive law of the state. 45 Within transplantation, 47 and its conceptualisation as a multi-participant model in which many actors, beyond the bilateral importer and exporter, take part. According to this paradigm, the colonial perception of legal transplants as movements of entire legal systems in a 'top-down' fashion is anachronistic and is not coherent with the reality of a globalised world comprised of transnational networks. 48 The long road that the legal transplant discourse has taken from Watson's starting point is thus significant. The numerous socio-legal scholars engaged with conceptualising the field have highlighted the complexity of this legal phenomenon as well as the impact of various factors on the configuration of diffusion processes. New research avenues have challenged the positivist postulations regarding the autonomous character of the law, its definitions and sources, and have suggested reviewing the various ties between the law and other disciplines from a pluralistic, socio-cultural and economic standpoint, as a precondition to further discussing the evolution and migration of the law.
Nevertheless, despite the substantial challenges posed by these scholars to the positivist framework, a broader, more explicit discussion of the identity of the carrier is still absent from the legal transplant discourse. In particular, despite specific references to global agents of change, such as NGOs and civil society organisations, the transplant dialogue often continues to revert to the colonial context, considering state-agents as the main carriers of the law. 49 Within this context, the potential role of TNCs as carriers of human rights norms through means of corporate social responsibility, and consequently, as important regulatory actors in this field, remains unaccounted for. Conceptualising TNCs' role as carriers may permit breaking free from the prevalent structuralist rhetoric, attempting to base the ability to promote human rights on the rejection of financial power. 
Applying the theory: The Rana Plaza disaster case study
Rana Plaza, an eight-storey commercial building in Dhaka, Bangladesh, housed five garment factories and over 5,000 employees. These factories produced garments for some of Europe's and the United States' largest clothing companies. On April 24th 2013, the building collapsed. Over 1,100 people were killed and thousands were injured. Most of the injured suffered from permanent injuries. 
Historical perspective
During the 1960s, aiming to maximise profit, Western companies such as Walmart, Gap, Sears, H&M and Ralph Lauren, initiated extensive processes of out-sourcing. By relocating their production sites from the Global North to postcolonial economies (mainly in the Far East), they profited from significantly cheaper labour costs. These economies enabled Western corporations to build on 'fast fashion' production models while enjoying flexible policies and a disciplined workforce who provided the same products for a fraction of the price in a fraction of the time. 
Transnational Corporations as Agents of Legal Change
Bangladesh, where the average minimum wage for a worker in the garment industry at the time of the Rana Plaza disaster was less than US$40 a month, 53 is one of the countries in which production costs are the lowest in the world. Benefitting from changes in global regulations of the garment industry and from bilateral agreements with the United States granting it relief on export taxes, it became one of the world's largest garment exporters. 54 Its garment industry comprises 80% of its annual exports, produces US$20 billion, and employs approximately four million workers in over 5000 factories.
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Although considered a parliamentary democracy, Bangladesh is still seeing massive violations of human rights in its territory. 56 Labour legislation has been built piece by piece, but has not been adjusted to Bangladesh's joining of the global market arena. 57 In 1992 a special governmental commission began trying to amend Bangladeshi labour legislation with the purpose of creating one coherent comprehensive code. In 2006, the Bangladesh Labour Act was enacted regulating various matters such as the minimum wage, working hours, child labour, workers' safety and more. Nevertheless, the government was concerned that enforcing the Labour Act on corporations would cause them to transfer their production sites elsewhere. These concerns withheld the government from enforcing its new standards on corporations, thus enabling factory owners to violate them systematically. 58 With the expansion of the garment industry, production processes became gradually decentralised, thus weakening the connection between the workers and the corporations for which they manufacture. This enabled TNCs to easily distance themselves from legal liability for violations of labour regulations and minimum wage requirements. 59 Nonetheless, after the Rana Plaza disaster and the media frenzy that ensued, the question of TNCs' legal liability began to arise.
The Disaster
The investigation conducted by local authorities following the disaster had revealed the building's collapse was a result of the illegal construction of additional floors occupied by several thousand workers. 60 As land values in Bangladesh rocketed following the rapid opening of factories to meet Western production demands, Mohammad Sohel Rana, the building owner, had used his political clout to illegally obtain title for the land on which Rana Plaza was built and the construction permit for the upper floors. 61 On the eve of the collapse, Rana Plaza factories were evacuated on police orders following complaints regarding cracks in their walls. An engineer was summoned to the scene and determined the building to be dangerous and in need of evacuation until a more extensive inquiry could be conducted. 62 However, the following day, workers were sent back into the building by factory owners under the threat of monthly salary deductions for those who refused to resume their work. 63 The factory owners, 64 operating under enormous pressure from western companies to meet their quotas, 65 sought to avoid losing working hours necessary for achieving those quotas. 66 The government's first investigation revealed that vibrations of the giant generators in the factories caused the building (whose rickety infrastructure was built, as aforementioned, against existing regulations) to collapse, in what was termed Bangladesh's worst industrial accident. 67 The collapse killed over 1,100 of Rana Plaza's workers, injured thousands, and left many others severely traumatised. Approximately two years after the collapse of Rana Plaza, in June 2015, the Bangladeshi authorities served indictments against the perpetrators involved in the collapse. 68 However, beyond the criminal charges brought against those involved directly in the omissions leading to the disaster, the Rana Plaza case led to an additional series of events relevant to this article's context. In June of the same year, two months after the collapse, the American government announced a programme suspending Bangladesh's trade privileges due to concerns regarding the safety and working conditions of the textile industry and its failure to uphold international labour standards. 69 Bangladesh was one of 125 countries that received tax relief under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). The GSP programme was established in an American attempt to safeguard international labour standards, enabling Bangladesh to export 5,000 products to the US-who purchases 25% of its yearly export-tax-free. 70 This decision of the American government was obtained following enormous pressure from international worker organisations and NGOs on the American administration to express its dissatisfaction with Bangladeshi working conditions. Despite differences between government and state department officials regarding the consequences of such actions, and the strong resistance of the Bangladeshi government, the American government decided to execute it.
71
Although this sanction on behalf of the American government was rather symbolic given that it did not apply to the import of garments and affected less than 1% of the American import from Bangladesh, the American government assumed that revoking Bangladesh's tax benefits would encourage European states to impose appropriate sanctions, thus creating the necessary pressure to change the Bangladeshi norms of protecting human and worker rights. was missing was increased sanctions against factory owners and individuals who violated the law, which remained especially lenient. 74 Alongside the aforementioned statist regulatory intervention, another important sphere in which measures were taken after the Rana Plaza disaster was the corporate one. As a direct response to the collapse, a group of American corporations established the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety ('the Alliance'). 75 The purpose of this initiative was to promote the safety level in
Bangladeshi garment factories in order to prevent the recurrence of disasters like Rana Plaza in the future. The Alliance's members pledged to provide a total of US $100 million in financing to factories in their supply chain in order to ameliorate working conditions in Bangladesh, and over 50 million dollars in finance to local banks in order to increase lending to garment factories undertaking remediation of the deficiencies and shortcomings in the existing factories. 76 Moreover, the Alliance publishes annual reports of the progress of its goals. In September 2015, the Alliance reported that it had conducted safety inspections in 661 factories, 22 of which remain under inspection and may close due to their safety conditions; 414 factories had introduced hotlines in order to respond to employee complaints; 597 factories had conducted worker safety training; and the Alliance had given US$100 million to factories in their supply chain.
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Another initiative established following Rana Plaza was the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh ('the Accord'). 78 The Accord was signed as a binding agreement between TNCs, professional unions and NGOs with the purpose of improving safety conditions in the garment industry in Bangladesh. The Accord obligated its members to act in favour of factory safety, conduct inspection plans, transparency and reporting regarding their findings, and promotion of employees through the proper training of the management of hotlines. In addition, the Accord has an enforcement mechanism similar to that of international treaties 74 ibid; See also NYU Report (n 59 The literature on Rana Plaza tends to concentrate, in its analysis of the corporate initiatives following the disaster, on the challenges TNCs pose to human and labour rights regimes, and on questions regarding the effectiveness of soft-law measures as opposed to states' obligations in the prevention of the recurrence of such tragedies. 83 This article, however, wishes to question whether it is possible to conceptualise the Accord, the Alliance and the Donors Trust Fund as backpacks in which TNCs have managed to carry human rights norms to Bangladesh as legal transplants. The article suggests that, by embracing a pluralistic, socio-legal view of the legal transplants field, one may perceive the norms and practices that the corporate initiatives detailed above attempted to implement as legal transplants in the field of human rights that are embedded in the wider regulatory frameworks of human and labour rights in Bangladesh. One of the most significant contributions of the Accord and the Alliance was the amelioration of working safety conditions in accordance with Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights which recognises a person's right to enjoy minimal working conditions, such as safety at work. 84 The reports published by the Accord indicate that, as of February 2016, safety inspections were conducted in 1,326 factories. 85 After conducting these safety inspections, including fire, electricity and structure safety, their findings are shared with factory owners, the signatory companies and worker representatives. The companies, together with the factory owners, later devised the Corrective Action Plans, detailing the remedial actions to be taken, a timeline for the proposed amendments and a financial plan to support them. The plans are then brought to engineers on behalf of the Accord for final approval. By November 2015, 1,195 Corrective Action Plans had been updated after follow-up inspections and approximately 20,000 amendments were made accordingly. 86 Moreover, the Accord delineates an equal participation of workers' mechanism concerning factory safety management by placing factory employees in health and safety commissions and involving them in the factories' inspection reports.
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The Alliance lacks the obligatory and enforcement mechanisms of the Accord and is criticised as such. 88 Such criticism is in line with international human rights scholars' statist perception and their clear distinction between hard law and soft law mechanisms, as well as their perception of the relevant regulatory actors who should participate in human rights regulation. However, the Alliance reported, like the Accord, actual progress with regard to workers' right to take part in shaping their employment conditions according to the ILO's fundamental principles. 89 Over 400 employees were trained in using the hotline, enabling them to anonymously report any deficiency in working conditions such as minimum wage and working hours. In addition, the Alliance initiated a pilot programme in twelve factories, establishing a democratically elected workers' representational committee in charge of safety and health at work issues.
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Many of the safety provisions promoted by the Accord and the Alliance were anchored in the Bangladeshi Labour Law 2006, and as aforementioned, most of them were amended in the 2013 amendment of the Law to provide better protection following the Rana Plaza disaster and the international pressure that ensued. Nonetheless, for many reasons, the law revealed itself as extremely limited when it came to enforcing its provisions.
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Due to this limitation, the Accord's and Alliance's ability to regulate issues of workers' safety and safeguard human rights norms as a new form of corporate social responsibility should be noticed. These initiatives could be regarded as de facto contributing to the infusion of globally recognised, treaty-based, human and worker rights norms, bottom-up, where state legislation failed to solely implement them top-down. As such, TNCs can be perceived as actively contributing to the institutionalisation of human rights in Bangladesh, although doing so through non-formal, non-binding, voluntary impositions of human rights norms.
This conclusion resonates with claims made by new governance theorists regarding the effectiveness of public-private, multi-actor collaborative regulation. According to transnational new governance theories, the new voluntary regulatory initiatives, such as the Accord and the Alliance, which are governed by firms and industry groups together with governments and NGOs (as opposed to traditional inter-state treaties or trans-governmental networks of state officials), are more conducive to information-sharing and learning than the state-centred, centralised old governance regulatory mechanisms. They allow policies to be tailored to the specific needs of the local population and local conditions rather than the enforcement (or lack of) uniform rules, 92 which, as previously stated, have failed in
Bangladesh to make a substantial difference on the ground. The collaboration between TNCs on the one hand, together with NGOs on the other, allows these two types of actors to each pursue their complementary goals. Initiatives such as the Accord and the Alliance permit the NGOs involved to encourage and sponsor higher labour standards in Bangladesh while also enabling the TNCs in such partnerships to enjoy self-regulation, rather than an imposed one. In turn, this results in the creation of joint standards that have the potential, not only to be more effectively implemented than if they were advocated by NGOs alone, but also more legitimate than codes formulated solely by corporations since they are backed by the normative legitimacy of the NGOs. 93 Moreover, TNCs'
willingness to contribute funds to advance the Accord and the Alliance's purposes, and to compensate the Rana Plaza victims, signals a clear recognition of their liability with regard to violations of human and worker rights. Subject to more empirical research, this recognition has the potential to promote local human rights discourse by empowering local populations, and educating them regarding their identity as right-holders.
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This suggests that, for all practical purposes, the initiatives described above should be regarded as a type of legal transplant. The model proposed by this article of the current transplant, in the spirit of the broader models offered by socio-legal scholars, recognises the migration of a variety of legal phenomena (standards, ideologies, and practices), from multiple sources (international treaties and principles) which pass through multiple levels (from the transnational/ international to the state and the sub-state) in formal and informal ways, through TNCs and with the help of international organisations, in an ongoing collaborative fashion. 95 The legal transplant in this case reaches the receiving state through corporate social responsibility practices adopted by the member corporations of the Accord and the Alliance, and are accepted with the help of the local citizenry through means of transparency and cooperation. It should be emphasised that the recognition of TNCs' role as potential carriers of human rights norms does not assume that corporations are the sole and first carriers to import such norms to countries lacking them. Obviously, a legislative framework recognising some of these rights and principles imported by TNCs following Rana Plaza existed beforehand, and as aforementioned, governmental responses to the disaster were also quick to ensue. However, and counterintuitively perhaps, the involvement of TNCs proved pivotal in shaping the local legal framework by means of transplantation of specific human rights practices in the working routine of these factories.
In line with new governance theorists, this conclusion regarding corporate legal transplantation draws our attention to the probabilities of success of such 'corporate transplants' as compared to those that originate from the state. Sociolegal scholars of legal transplants frequently discuss the important connection between the transplanted law and other social structures in predicting successful acceptance of the transplant. 96 Within this framework, the larger the gap between the transplanted legal norm and the recipient society's social structures, the more difficult for the transplanted norm to be successfully implemented. This view has led scholars to doubt the viability of legal transplants altogether.
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This socio-legal logic may indeed explain the difficulties in human rights reception in Bangladesh by statist channels. Meaning, the gap between the social structures of a developing state such as Bangladesh and the rationales standing at the base of human rights norms creates a true hardship for the proper reception and implementation of human rights by means of signing and ratifying international treaties. Indeed, Bangladeshi attempts to make changes in labour legislation following Rana Plaza, in a manner that will ensure worker safety and rights, has failed to produce any change. The gap between the rationales at the base of these constitutional and legal changes and the economic structures in Bangladesh which dictate workers' reality and conditions, were far too great to successfully accept such changes. Socio-legal scholars focus primarily on the state level and mark the agents of change-carriers of legal transplants-as the state's agents alone. In the corporate context, nonetheless, the legal transplant process occurs within the premises of the 'corporate greenhouse' . The promotion of human rights is not done at the state level, trickling down through the state's institutions to civil society, but rather bottomup, through the corporate venue. In other words, it is the corporate entity rather than the state that instigates the legal transplantation of human rights norms by voluntarily adhering to internationally accepted standards and providing its employees with their corresponding rights. In this state of affairs, the society with which the legal norm has to be connected in order to guarantee the transplant's success is the 'corporate society' or the corporate arena. This arena has a priori more liberal characteristics, so as to potentially reduce the gap between the 'social structures' of the corporation and the western-liberal-originated human rights norms that are assimilated through them. One may thus suppose that the same 'corporate liberal arena' may serve as a more fertile environment for the reception of liberal human rights norms by its employees than the state arena in which these norms are often disconnected from their social and cultural structures.
This assumption might spur new thoughts with regard to the field of the sociology of human rights. The proposed discussion of Rana Plaza and the influence of corporations on the local promotion of human rights after the disaster does not focus solely on normative questions of what is appropriate or just, but aims to describe an additional link in the development of human rights regimes in Bangladesh. The acceptance of the proposition according to which TNCs may contribute, through corporate social responsibility practices, to the infusion of human rights norms enriches our understanding of the variety of ways through which human rights are defined and the web of actors that take part in their design and institutionalisation. In other words, the conceptualisation of corporate social responsibility as a legal transplant leads to understanding that human rights regimes are not only formed through state-reception of international treaties, and the influence of transnational networks of NGOs, but through the commercial activity of TNCs as well.
This conclusion undermines the archetypical perception of TNCs and their operation as necessarily posing a threat to human rights regimes. On this view, the threat to human rights regimes is inherent to economic power and global capitalism. 98 However, the Rana Plaza case challenges the pessimist assumptions associated with this paradigm, and demonstrates how TNCs, holding great economic power, have the potential to serve as regulatory agents influencing the diffusion and design of human rights standards. TNCs' actions following Rana Plaza in the form of the Accord, the Alliance and the Donors Fund, not only contribute, within a wider regulatory framework, to the promotion of safety standards and employee status, but also have the potential to affect human rights discourses in Bangladesh and to create new understandings amongst the local population regarding the universal rights to which they are entitled. Socio-legal empirical research in the field of human rights should thus focus on the possible ways in which the implementation of corporate social responsibility practices may flush out the gap between the governmental and legal rhetoric and the true situation on the ground. The recognition of the existence of a universal system of rights which are owned by the workers as such can serve as a platform for social mobilisation by re-designing workers' ability to fight locally for their rights and demand the state for a practical implementation of the law in the books. 99 The case of Rana Plaza, therefore, suggests that, contrary to the typical structuralist stand, economic power does not necessarily only violate human rights, but may, under certain conditions, improve them.
on western corporations in the garment sector for their income, especially rural populations which do not have alternative employment opportunities. 103 Disney's choice to relocate production sites thus does not lead to better living conditions, and might even harm the local population's social mobility. Disney's claims that the risk to human lives justifies the potential economic damage to developing states was thus not sympathetically accepted. 104 The prevalent stance was that TNCs should maintain their supply chains as is, in order to support developing economies, but nevertheless take an active role in ameliorating working conditions while upholding international standards. 105 This stance perceives TNCs as substantial actors in the design and formulation of local human rights regimes and attributes them with irrevocable social responsibilities once they have chosen to utilise the commercial benefits that come along with relocating production sites to post-colonial settings. The conceptualisation of TNCs' regulatory role as carriers of legal transplants in the field of human rights, and so as agents of change, clarifies the additional contribution of the legal transplants paradigm. The discussion of corporate social responsibility within the soft-law paradigm, as well as under the old governance assumptions, primarily focuses on the ways in which it contributes to restraining TNCs' destructive power with regard to human rights. The basic assumption underlying this discussion is that the TNC is unequivocally an obstacle to the promotion of human rights norms.
Conversely, the discussion of corporate social responsibility within the legal transplant paradigm offers a different perspective, which focuses on the possible contribution of TNCs as significant agents of change to the diffusion of human rights within the statist boundaries. Under this paradigm, therefore, one can move from the normative discussion of legal liability to empirical questions, such as the effectiveness of legal transplants and the necessary means to an efficient diffusion of norms and thus to come one step closer to the effective institutionalisation of human rights regimes where they are lacking. 
Conclusion
The case study of Rana Plaza and the collaborative initiatives formulated by TNCs and NGOs that ensued reflect some necessary changes in perception within the international human rights scholarship. As new governance scholars have begun to suggest in certain contexts, non-state actors can no longer be regarded as objects of international regulation alone, but should be treated as equal partners in international governance.
The novel angle that the present article offers is to consider the corporate actor as a regulator and an agent of change in the field of international human rights law, and to characterise its regulatory role as a form of legal transplantation. The theoretical merit of this approach is that it regards TNCs as active participants in the design and formulation of human rights regimes, rather than precarious objects that need to be regulated.
Legal transplants theories, which primarily discuss the way that systems of law are created and evolve, have often underestimated this role of private actors, much less of private corporations, in institutionalising legal norms and their contribution to their design. Although recognising a more diverse set of actors involved in the diffusion of law, legal transplants theories have, in many respects, remained state-centric. In the same manner, sociologists of human rights discussing the mobilisation processes of human rights have also been focusing primarily on state mechanisms influencing the diffusion of human rights amongst states and within them.
Thus, by conceptualising TNCs as carriers of legal transplants and concretising such a conception through the case study of Rana Plaza, this article joins new governance claims with regard to the perception of private actors' role in the operation of governance and regulation. Once TNCs' role as carriers of legal transplants, and hence as agent of change in the field of human rights, is seriously considered, new avenues of research can be paved to support policy decisions on the global level with regard to the promotion of human rights regimes, as well as to help develop critical thinking as to the pitfalls of such private transnational regulation. Furthermore, recognising TNCs' regulatory role in the field of human rights raises normative questions with regard to our understanding of human rights theories and doctrines, and the way in which human rights regimes are formed in an era of dominant transnational corporate power.
